Deterrence by punishment raises costs by threateningretaliation for the action.
Example: threatening to send people to prison for breaking-and-entering.
Example:threatening a nuclear strike in response to an invasion.
“Thebestdefenseisastrongoffense.”
KEYPOINTS
In both cases, the goal is to make certain the action isnever attempted.
Ifaburglar triestobreakintoyourhouse but fails because ofyour strong locks, that isnotsuccessful deterrence.
Communicationisvital.
Theburglarneedstoknowaboutthelocks.
CHALLENGE FOR COMMUNICATION: CREDIBILITY
Canofcourse tell another actor that you have a greatdefense, or threaten them with retaliation, but what if they donot believe you?
If you put a sign saying “This door has top-notch locks!” on your door,the burglar may think you are lying and try anyway.
Likewise,iftheburglarthinkstheywillnotbecaught,they will not bedeterred by the prospect of prison time.
CREDIBILITY FOR DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
Needtosomehow prove that you have the defenses you claim.
Sometimes this is easy, because your defenses are directly observableor widely reported on.
Ex.A well-known,well-testedmissiledefensesystem.
Sometimes this is hard, either because yourdefensesarenotdirectlyobservable, or because revealing their nature would weaken them.
Ex. Military strategy forrepellinganinvasion.
CREDIBILITY FOR DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT
This is a bit more complicated than credibility fordeterrence by denial. The actor to be deterred has tobelieve two things:
Youarecapableofcarryingoutthethreat.
You arewillingto carry out the threat.
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE THREAT
Similar to credibility for deterrence by denial, need to prove you have theoffensive capabilities you claim.
Sometimes this is easy, because your capabilities are easily observed andwidely reported on.
Example: the U.S. military.
Sometimes this is hard,either becauseyour capabilitiesare not directlyobservable, or because revealing their nature would weaken them.
Ex.Amilitarystrikethatreliesonintelligenceyourenemy does not know you have.
WILLING TO CARRY OUT THE THREAT
Evenifyouarecapableofcarryingoutthethreat,targethastobelieveyou are willing topaythecost ofdoingso.
Ifthecostofcarrying out the threat is greater than thecost to you of the action you are trying to deter, then it ishard to believe you will carry it out.
A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES OF INCREDIBLE THREATS
Threatening to shoot someone if they steal your Snickersbar.
The U.S. threatening to impose sanctions on Canada ifCanada spies on the U.S. government.
A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES OF CREDIBLE THREATS
Threatening to no longerhelpsomeonewiththeirhomeworkiftheystealyourSnickers bar.
Costofthreathasbeenreduced.
The U.S. threatening to impose sanctions on Canada ifCanada supplies Cuba with nuclear missiles.
Cost of target’s action has been increased.
KEY POINT
In general, threats that impose a highercostarebetter, but only if they are credible.
Assumingtheotherpersonbelieved you, threatening toshoot someone would make them more reluctant to stealyour Snickers bar than threatening to not help them withtheir homework.
CONCLUSION
For both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment,need to be able to show you have the capabilities you claim.
For deterrencebypunishment, targetalsohastobelievethatyou will carry out the threat.
Remember, though, that a threat can be credible and still failbecause it does not raise costs enough.
