In this case, using cyber to spy may reassure one side aboutthe other’s intentions.
Lessobviousproblem (from bargaining theory ofwar): private information and incentives tomisrepresent.
PRIVATE INFORMATION
Basic setup: there is always a bargain that is better than war, but itis based on the probability each side will win.
StateA thinks it has an 80% chance towin, so will offer a bargainthat reflects this.
But, StateB has upgraded its military, knows it has a 50% chancetowin, so will not accept the bargain. But why does State B not justtell State A the truth?
INCENTIVES TO MISREPRESENT
What if State A really does have an 80% chance to win?
State B might lie and claim it has a 50% chance towin. Ifitcould convince A this is the case, would have to give away less.
So State A cannot tell if State B is lying or not; as a result abargain cannot be reached and war occurs.
BUT WHAT IF WE HAVE CYBER CAPABILITIES?
Now State A can easily and cheaply spy onState B, and find out its true capabilities!
State Awillproposethecorrectbargain,andwarwillnotbreakout.
INFORMATION PROVISION
Cause of war: misunderstanding or fearingintentions
→can use cyber to determine actualintentions
Causeof war: concealing actual capabilities.
→can use cyber to determine actualcapabilities
LACK OF ALTERNATIVES
Sometimes one actor will risk a military strikebecause there are no obvious alternatives.
Example:Israel’s military strike on suspectedSyrian nuclear reactor.
This can easily escalate.
SUBSTITUTION
Cyber could reduce conflict by giving states analternative to a military attack.